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Abstract—Contention-based MAC protocols for wireless ad
hoc LANs rely on random deferment of packet transmissions
to avoid collisions. By selfishly modifying the probabilities
of deferments greedy stations can grab more bandwidth than
regular stations that apply standard-prescribed probabilities.
To discourage such misbehaviour we propose a protocol called
RT-hash whereby the winner of a contention is determined us-
ing a public hash function of the channel feedback. RT-hash is
effective in a full hearability topology, assuming that improper
timing of control frames is detectable and that greedy stations
do not resort to malicious actions. Simulation experiments
show that RT-hash protects regular stations’ bandwidth share
against various sophisticated greedy strategies of deferment
selection; as such it may contribute to MAC-layer network
security.
Keywords—wireless LAN, MAC protocol, noncooperative set-
ting.
1. Introduction
Ad hoc wireless packet networks offer the possibility of
cheap on-demand interconnection of a set of stations (mo-
bile user terminals) in an environment where any fixed com-
munication infrastructure would turn out either physically
or economically infeasible [1]. As the underlying technol-
ogy matures, ad hoc networks expand from their traditional
niche of disaster management and military systems to pub-
lic local- and wide-area data communications and become
an attractive alternative to costly wireline networks. This
expansion, however, brings new design challenges that are
critical to ad hoc networks’ long-term survival. Namely, ad-
herence to the deployed standard communication protocols
can no longer be counted on for several reasons. Firstly,
if the stations of an ad hoc network are not subjected to
a common authority then there are no administrative fa-
cilities like log-in, traffic monitoring, service accessibility,
conformance testing etc., which implies that punishment
for a station’s misbehaviour can only be enforced by other
stations in a distributed fashion. Secondly, ad hoc networks
guarantee a certain degree of anonymity—any station may
disappear at any time (switch off, move out of range or
switch identity) and reappear later pretending to be another
station; therefore it need not fear any punishment that does
not materialise instantly. For example, ill reputation based
on cumulative statistics of past packet transmissions [2]
would not make a serious disincentive to stations willing to
misbehave. The emergent noncooperative design paradigm
is now establishing itself as a part of wireless network se-
curity planning [3].
In this paper we focus on MAC-layer selfish misbehaviour
whereby a station may depart from the standard rules of
contention for the wireless channel so as to grab a larger-
than-fair share of the available bandwidth. Such misbe-
haviour is indeed possible, contrary to the popular opinion
that adherence to standard MAC protocols is only natu-
ral if the stations want to stay “synchronised” [4]. Con-
sider the class of distributed MAC contention protocols,
sometimes referred to as random token (RT) [5], that rely
on random deferment of packet transmissions for collision
avoidance. These include HIPERLAN/1 [6] and CSMA/CA
with RTS/CTS exchange [7], later incorporated into the
IEEE 802.11 MAC standard [8]. In any instance of con-
tention the winner is the station whose deferment is extreme
among the contending stations; this condition is equiva-
lent of capturing a unique token that visits the stations in
random order rather than sequentially. By manipulating
the probability distribution of transmission deferment a sta-
tion can easily outperform stations that apply a standard-
prescribed probability distribution [9, 10].
The purpose of this paper is to propose a new proto-
col called RT-hash in order to prevent MAC-layer misbe-
haviour. Specifically, we propose to determine the win-
ner of a contention using a public hash function of the
feedback each station gets from the contention. This is
hoped to confuse misbehaving stations in such a way that
no modification of the probability distribution of transmis-
sion deferment should appear beneficial to them. Given
that, they may resort to more sophisticated deferment se-
lection strategies, which we attempt to anticipate and the
impact of which we attempt to evaluate.
Note that the feedback from a contention is implicitly
assumed to be uniform across all stations; this implies
a single-hop wireless LAN (WLAN) setting and perfect
channel operation. We believe that, although hidden sta-
tions and transmission errors may affect the protocol we
propose, the illustrative and qualitative value of the pre-
sented results will not be diminished.
The paper is organised as follows. In Section 2 the network
model and a framework for MAC-layer misbehaviour are
outlined. Section 3 presents the RT-hash protocol against
the background of earlier RT-like protocols and examines
the requirements for the public hash function, assuming
random selection of transmission deferments. In Section 4
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some sophisticated selection strategies are discussed; their
impact on the RT-hash protocol is evaluated in Section 5.
Section 6 concludes the paper.
2. The model
We consider a number of stations interconnected by
a single-channel wireless network. The proposed model
reflects the general idea of an ad hoc system outlined in
Section 1. We begin with the network station model and
then present our model of MAC-layer misbehaviour.
2.1. The network station model
As can be expected of an ad hoc system, the station model
mostly consists of non-assumptions. Namely we accept that
a station need not:
– stay interconnected all the time or maintain a per-
manent identity; thus in general the number of sta-
tions N need not be fixed or known,
– communicate its present identity to any station other
than the recipient(s) of its current transmission; thus
from the viewpoint of the MAC protocol the stations
are anonymous,
– interpret any transmitted data of which it is not an
intended uni- or multicast recipient (except for detect-
ing carrier on the channel); thus it can fully encrypt
its communications and use any data format it has
agreed on along with the current recipient(s).
To remove the dependence on a particular hearability
topology, station mobility model, multihop packet
forwarding protocol and traffic scenario, as well as the
physical characteristics of the wireless channel, we also
assume that
– all stations hear each other’s transmissions directly,
i.e., the network is a single-hop WLAN,
– each station always has a packet ready to send, i.e.,
the network operates under heavy load conditions,
and
– the characteristics of the wireless channel and the
attained signal-to-noise ratio ensure error-free trans-
mission between any pair of stations.
Further, to simplify the presentation of the RT protocols,
we assume that each station synchronises to a global slotted
time axis. A slot allows for a transmission and reception
of a MAC protocol’s control frame and leaves enough time
for each station to decide the type of the slot based on the
feedback from sensing the channel. A station distinguishes
v- or c-type slots sensed, for “void” or “carrier”; moreover,
a recipient of a successful (i.e., non-colliding) transmis-
sion recognises an s-type slot, for “success”, and reads its
contents. This type of binary feedback facilitates colli-
sion avoidance and is employed in deferment-based MAC
protocols, e.g., in the form of RTS/CTS exchange [7, 8].
We shall prefer the term pilot/reaction mechanism instead
of RTS/CTS in reference to a generic RT protocol to stress
that the format and semantics of the involved control frames
may differ from those specified by the IEEE 802.11 stan-
dard.
In the pilot/reaction mechanism each station synchronises
to the start of a protocol cycle, marked by a v-type slot
following a packet transmission. Subsequent slots are clas-
sified by all the stations as contention slots, in which pi-
lot frames can be transmitted, and reaction slots, reserved
for reaction frames. The first slot of a protocol cycle is
a contention one; any c- or s-type contention slot is fol-
lowed by a reaction slot and then another contention slot;
a v-type contention slot is followed by another contention
slot. A station with a packet ready defers for a number
of slots (the transmission deferment) and transmits a pilot.
Further action depends on the channel feedback the station
gets in the following reaction slot. The transmission de-
ferment may vary from one protocol cycle to another as
dictated by a selection strategy. In existing RT protocols
this number is drawn from a uniform probability distribu-
tion over a range of values; such a strategy will be called
Randomiser. It should be noted, however, that the selection
strategy need not be a part of the protocol; strictly speak-
ing, the protocol only defines the rules of contention such
that all the stations can reach a consensus regarding the
winner or a no-winner outcome.
2.2. Model of MAC-layer misbehaviour
A taxonomy of ad hoc station misbehaviour presented
in [11] suggests distinguishing selfish and malicious misbe-
haviour; this roughly corresponds to rational vs. irrational
motivation for departures from standard protocols. Self-
ish MAC-layer misbehaviour is rational in that a station
may want to grab a larger-than-fair share of the available
bandwidth, but will not act just to reduce other stations’
throughput without a clear benefit for its own. For exam-
ple, issuing unnecessary pilots or jamming other stations’
transmissions “for the fun of it” is irrational in terms of
own throughput and power consumption. In the context of
RT protocol, selfish misbehaviour can be twofold: a station
can either violate the rules of contention or adopt a selec-
tion strategy other than Randomiser. The former type of
misbehaviour would have to involve improper timing of pi-
lot/reaction frames; e.g., a station might transmit several
pilots in a protocol cycle while the rules of contention al-
low only one. Such behaviour is detectable by means of
a directional antenna and as such could in principle be im-
mediately punished. On the other hand, tampering with
a selection strategy is hard to detect and prove by other
stations. Long-term statistical analysis of transmitted pack-
ets might reveal significant departures from Randomiser;
unfortunately such an approach is pointless in view of the
assumed station anonymity and packet encryption.
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Following the approach in [9, 10], we wish to develop an
RT-type MAC protocol for which no rational selection strat-
egy will perform substantially better than Randomiser. The
following framework for MAC-layer misbehaviour is as-
sumed:
– all N stations comply with the rules of contention,
– G stations are greedy, i.e., willing to grab a larger-
than-fair share of the available bandwidth; these are
free to use any selection strategy (G need not be fixed
or known to any station),
– the other N–G stations are regular, i.e., apply Ran-
domiser,
– a greedy station acts in isolation, i.e., cannot coordi-
nate its selection strategy with other greedy stations.
The last assumption may seem controversial. It is reason-
able if one presumes that stations are reluctant to reveal
their greedy status to others. However, collusion among
some greedy stations is not unthinkable [12]. In fact,
a worst-case greedy selection strategy we consider in Sec-
tion 4.3 approaches a collusion scenario.
3. Random token protocols
The RT-hash protocol presented in this section breaks with
the rule requiring that the winner’s deferment be extreme
among the contending stations. To clarify this difference
we first briefly summarise some earlier RT protocols [10].
3.1. RT and RT-1s protocols
A station with a packet ready to send selects a deferment
between 0 and D–1 contention slots (D is an integer pa-
rameter) and when it expires, transmits a pilot frame. The
pilot contains the recipient’s identity (possibly in an implicit
manner, e.g., using the recipient’s public or symmetric en-
cryption key) and in addition may contain the first fragment
of the packet. Since full encryption is allowed, to all non-
recipients the pilot is merely a burst of non-interpretable
carrier. If at some station the frame decrypts to a cor-
rect pilot, that station has just sensed an s-type slot and
recognised itself as a recipient. In such a case it issues in
the following reaction slot a reaction frame that is merely
a burst of carrier. Having sensed the reaction slot follow-
ing the pilot as c-type, the sender of the pilot continues to
send the remaining part of the packet. A lack of reaction
(i.e., a v-type reaction slot) marks a pilot collision and ter-
minates the protocol cycle (Fig. 1). Note that a greedy
station can do no harm by jamming a reaction frame. Nor
can it benefit from issuing a reaction frame if it is not
a recipient or from not issuing one if it is a recipient.
Under RT, greedy stations need only a minor alteration
of the standard random selection strategy to monopolise
the channel bandwidth. A modified protocol called RT-1s
(for “first success”) [10] is somewhat more resistant to
greedy stations. Under RT-1s, stations whose pilots were
not reacted to back off until the next protocol cycle, while
the rest are free to transmit their pilots in subsequent con-
tention slots (Fig. 2). Note that the back-off provision im-
plies that the threat of misbehaviour detection using a di-
rectional antenna is serious enough to discourage greedy
stations from transmitting more than one pilot per protocol
cycle. Also note that the start of a protocol cycle is now
marked either by the termination of a packet transmission
or by D consecutive v-type slots (in this regard D is an
analogue of DIFS in IEEE 802.11).
3.2. RT-hash protocol
Random token-hash aims to improve on RT-1s in the pres-
ence of greedy stations. The protocol operation is illus-
trated in Fig. 3. A station with a packet ready to send defers
for a number of contention slots between 0 and D–1. Sub-
sequently it transmits a pilot and awaits a reaction. Now
each intended recipient transmits a reaction if an s-type slot
is sensed, while refraining from reaction if a c-type slot is
sensed. The presence or absence of a reaction permits the
other stations to deduce that the previous slot was s- or
c-type, respectively.
When D contention slots have elapsed, along with the cor-
responding reaction slots (if any), all stations arrive at an
identical feedback vector f = ( f1 . . . fD) with fi = 0, 1 or 2
if the ith contention slot was v-, s- or c-type, respectively.
Denote S(f) = {i | fi = 1}. All stations then have to agree
on a unique i∗ ∈ S(f) designating the winning slot (and con-
sequently the winner station), or on a no-winner outcome
if S(f) = ∅. In Fig. 3, f = (0 2 0 1 1 0 0) and S(f) = {4, 5},
therefore i∗ = 4 or 5. This designates station 3 or station 2
as the winner, respectively.
A unique i∗ can be agreed on by defining a deterministic
hash function H on the set of possible f. The value returned
by H will index into the set S(f) written in ascending order.
In the above example, H(f) = 1 would indicate i∗ = 4 and
H(f) = 2 would indicate i∗ = 5. The function H should have
suitable mixing properties. In particular, it should compute
to uniformly distributed values for randomly chosen f and
prevent greedy stations from easy guessing of the winning
slot based on the observed prefix of f. Of the many possible
hash functions, two (denoted H1 and H2) have been selected
for a closer examination. Let v(f) be the numerical value
whose ternary representation is f. Then
H1(f) = 1+ v(f) mod |S(f)|
H2(f) = 1+ round [pi · v(f)] mod |S(f)| , (1)
where pi = 3.14159265358979, | · | denotes cardinality and
round symbolises rounding to the nearest integer. Extensive
simulation was carried out to evaluate the mixing proper-
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Fig. 1. RT protocol; N = 4, D ≥ 4 (dashed line marks end of protocol cycle).
Fig. 2. RT-1s protocol cycle; N = 4, D ≥ 4 (stations 1 and 4 back off, station 3 wins).
Fig. 3. RT-hash; N = 4, D = 7.
ties of H1 and H2, with each of N stations applying Ran-
domiser. After 1000 instances of contention a histogram
hist of winning slots was obtained and its normalised en-
tropy was computed:
normalised entropy =
−
D
∑
i=1
hist(i) · log2 hist(i)
log2 D
. (2)
For an ideal hash function, (2) should be close to unity.
This was emulated by replacing a hash function by a ran-
dom number generator (rand). In Fig. 4, H1 and H2 are
compared to rand in terms of (2); H2 was found more sat-
isfactory and was taken for further experiments. The results
presented in Fig. 4 were generated for D = 10; other sim-
ulation experiments show little dependence of (2) on D.
Note that the above results are only valid if a station does
not have any additional information about the ongoing con-
tention. This need not be the case for a greedy station,
which might choose to defer a pilot transmission until
a long enough prefix of f has been observed. The longer
the observed prefix, the worse are the mixing properties
of H2 for the remaining slots. For example, for D = 10 the
prefix (2 1 0 1 0 2) yields almost even probabilities of win-
ning for the remaining four slots, while (1 2 0 1 0 2) yields
1%, 45%, 12% and 0%. Figure 5 depicts the normalised
entropy for the remaining D–L slots, averaged over all
L-long prefixes of f. One sees that a greedy station in-
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Fig. 4. Mixing properties of hash functions; D = 10.
Fig. 5. Mixing properties of H2 conditioned on L-long prefixes
of f; D = 10 (note the difference in scale compared to Fig. 4).
deed can substantially improve the chances of winning
based on the observed prefix. Such an attack is described
in Section 4.4.
4. Selection strategies
Greedy stations self-optimise by departing from Ran-
domiser. Because self-optimising strategies do not form
a definite set, suitable heuristics should be sought; some
are outlined below.
4.1. Aggressive Randomiser
While regular stations use Randomiser, greedy stations may
resort to a more “aggressive” probability distribution of
deferments, i.e., shifted toward short deferments (Fig. 6).
We take it to be a convex quadratic function, namely
Pr(deferment = l) = const. · [1 +(l −D + 1)2]. The differ-
ence between Randomiser and Aggressive Randomiser is
Fig. 6. Probability distributions of Randomiser (a) and Aggres-
sive Randomiser (b).
that the former attempts to optimise the overall bandwidth
utilisation, whereas the latter is self-optimising.
4.2. Optimal Randomiser
In the Optimal Randomiser selection strategy, all G greedy
stations select transmission deferments at random using
a common probability distribution p that maximises the
bandwidth share they collectively obtain. In numerical ex-
periments, a reinforced random search was applied to de-
termine p, starting from a uniform distribution. In each of
10000 steps, 0.05 was tentatively subtracted from one ran-
domly chosen element of p and added to another, with the
new values only retained if they increased the bandwidth
shares of the greedy stations.
Optimal Randomiser violates the isolation constraint
since p is assumed common to all the greedy stations. It
is considered as a worst-case scenario from the regular sta-
tions’ viewpoint.
4.3. Pseudoperiodic
Suppose the G greedy stations are not subject to the isola-
tion constraint. Firstly, they will arrange to select different
deferments to avoid pilot collisions. Secondly, under RT
and RT-1s, short deferments will be preferred. For G = 4,
a strategy in Table 1 may be conceived. Each greedy sta-
tion defines a deferment sequence for T consecutive pro-
tocol cycles and repeats it periodically. In the absence of
regular stations this amounts to passing a token from one
greedy station to another; the sequence of token holders is
also periodic with period T = 5. The presence of regular
stations may disturb this, but only through pilot collisions
in slot 0.
Table 1
Deferments selected by greedy stations in periodic
token passing
Greedy
Instants of contention
a b c d e
1 0 3 2 1 3
2 1 0 3 2 1
3 2 1 0 3 0
4 3 2 1 0 2
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Under RT or RT-1s, Table 1 exemplifies a Nash equilibrium
point [13], i.e., none of the greedy stations can improve its
bandwidth share by unilaterally deviating from the speci-
fied deferment sequence. The equilibrium is not fair in that
the stations are not guaranteed equal bandwidth shares (sta-
tion 3 will obtain the largest on account of its double 0-slot
deferment). Taking only the first four columns and T = 4
yields symmetry in the deferment distribution as well as in
the obtained bandwidth shares.
The Pseudoperiodic selection strategy aims to reconcile the
isolation constraint with the idea of token passing. Each
greedy station initially applies a periodic deferment se-
quence (s1 s2 . . . sT ), si ∈ {0, . . . , D−1}, e.g., s5 = 3 means
a 3-slot deferment in every 5th protocol cycle. Denote
by ei the currently observed frequency of winning the ith
contention. At the end of each period, the ei’s are updated
using a low-pass filter:
∀
i∈{1,...,T}
ei = α · ei +(1−α) · lasti , (3)
where α ∈ [0, 1] and lasti equals 1 if the ith contention
was won and 0 otherwise. Subsequently, with a fixed
probability, the worst-performing selection is modified,
i.e., si∗ is replaced by a new randomly chosen value if
ei∗ = min{e1, e2, . . . , eT}. Thus Pseudoperiodic perma-
nently improves the obtained bandwidth share.
Technically, the isolation constraint is violated again: the
greedy stations have to apply identical T (or its multiple)
since lack of synchronisation inevitably leads to more fre-
quent collisions. Nevertheless, the choice of T = D seems
natural; one can also imagine a version of Pseudoperiodic
with optimisation of T .
4.4. Antihash
The Antihash selection strategy (Fig. 7) was devised to
exploit the reduction of the normalised entropy (2) condi-
tioned on the observed prefix. Having observed an L-long
prefix fL of f, a greedy station uses the statistics of recent
Fig. 7. Antihash; D = 7, L = 4.
protocol cycles to calculate a posterior probability distribu-
tion over possible continuations fD−L and over the respec-
tive winning slots H2(fLfD−L). The most promising slot
between the (L + 1)th and Dth is then determined; if it is
not the (L+1)th one, the analysis is repeated one slot later
with an (L+1)-long prefix observed.
5. Performance evaluation
In a series of simulation experiments, regular and greedy
stations were contending for access to the medium un-
der heavy load (all stations always had packets ready to
transmit). The latter assumption implies concurrent trans-
fer of large files, a perfect scenery for selfish behaviour. In
most simulations a fixed number N = 10 of stations was
assumed, with D = 10 and a variable number of greedy
stations (G ∈ {0, . . . , N}). Packets were of fixed size
S = 50 slots.
Fig. 8. Optimal Randomiser versus Randomiser.
In Fig. 8, the average regular station’s bandwidth share,
denoted by Ur, is plotted against G for RT, RT-1s and
RT-hash. Regular and greedy stations applied Randomiser
and Optimal Randomiser, respectively. G = 0 corresponds
to an all-cooperative setting; Ur is then slightly lower than
1/N or 10% of the channel bandwidth on account of the
scheduling penalty; this effect is stronger for RT-hash. In
a noncooperative setting (G > 0), Ur is even lower under
RT and RT-1s. While the former protocol is unaccept-
able, the latter seems to cope with the presence of greedy
stations fairy well, especially when they use Aggressive
Randomiser. Unlike RT and RT-1s, RT-hash holds its own
regardless of G. Figure 8 can be explained by inspecting
the optimal probability distribution p found by a reinforced
random search. They are given in Fig. 9 for G = 4. Un-
der RT, p is strongly biased toward short deferments; under
RT-1s this bias is far less visible. Clearly, the more uniform
p the greedy stations arrive at, the less they benefit. In this
regard RT-hash is ideal since favouring or discriminating
any particular deferment causes more frequent pilot colli-
sions. Thus the selection strategies of regular and greedy
stations are identical.
Figure 8 also illustrates a drawback of RT-hash, namely
large overhead (as noticed at G = 0). This is because each
contention lasts until all D contention slots (along with the
corresponding reaction slots) have elapsed. For example,
S = 50 and D = 10 result in a 30% overhead; clearly it
decreases with S. Additional simulations of RT-hash were
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Fig. 9. Probability distribution p for Optimal Randomiser;
N = 10, G = 4, D = 10: (a) RT; (b) RT-1s; (c) RT-hash.
Fig. 10. Bandwidth utilisation under RT-hash.
carried out to determine the overhead under diverse param-
eter settings (N = 5..45, D = 1..25); the results are given
in Fig. 10. For N = 10, the optimal D is equal to 4 and
reduces the overhead to less than 20%. Unfortunately there
is no uniformly optimal D across various N. A possible
solution could be to make D variable and dependent on
a current estimate of N, e.g., based on the observed sums
f1 + ...+ fD in recent instances of contention.
In Fig. 11, regular stations used Randomiser, while greedy
stations used Pseudoperiodic. For Pseudoperiodic, T = D =
= 10 and α = 0.95 were fixed. The latter value implies that
the ei are influenced by the last few dozens of periods. The
final deferment sequences at the greedy stations were found
to be close to those in Table 1. The greedy stations, none
of them having knowledge of the number or status of other
stations, managed to establish a token passing sequence.
Fig. 11. Pseudoperiodic versus Randomiser.
Observe that as G increases, Pseudoperiodic turns out in-
creasingly beneficial for the greedy stations, reflecting the
fact that the token passing scheme inherently avoids pilot
collisions, whereas Randomiser does not. However, the
benefits depend on the protocol. RT is definitely not resis-
tant to Pseudoperiodic; RT-1s is uniformly superior to RT,
although for G > N/2 the results are comparably unsatisfac-
tory. The dotted “RT-1s A” line corresponds to Aggressive
Randomiser applied at regular stations under RT-1s. A bet-
ter performance for G < N/2 is now observed; still, the
range of unfavourable G remains the same. RT-hash pre-
vents regular stations from being cut off even for larger G, at
the price of an increased protocol overhead.
In each simulation run, the results presented in Fig. 11
were unfolding gradually. At the beginning, a greedy sta-
tion’s bandwidth share was comparable to a regular sta-
tion’s. Figure 12 shows a sample run under RT-1s. After
about 1400 protocol cycles the greedy stations managed
to establish a token passing sequence. In general, under
all the considered protocols, it took greedy stations fewer
44
Application of a hash function to discourage MAC-layer misbehaviour in wireless LANs
Fig. 12. Pseudoperiodic versus Randomiser under RT-1s; G = 5,
N = 10.
than 2000 protocol cycles to stabilise their bandwidth shares
at a high level. With 1500-byte packets and a 10 Mbit/s
channel, this translates to less than 3 s. Thus a few seconds’
time is enough to threaten regular stations even in changing
traffic conditions. This raises the question, if Pseudoperi-
odic is so effective, could it be adopted as a regular station’s
standard strategy? The answer is no, for the following rea-
sons:
– Pseudoperiodic is not fair in that the resulting band-
width distribution heavily depends on the initial de-
ferment sequences; in extreme cases, some greedy
stations were observed to perform worse than regular
ones,
– under RT-1s, Pseudoperiodic is not resistant to some
simple selection strategies, e.g., consistent selection
of a 0-slot deferment.
Finally, the performance of Antihash is given in Fig. 13.
Note that this strategy might be beneficial only if there is
only one greedy station; more would always collide. There-
fore in our simulations G = 1 was fixed, with N ranging
Fig. 13. Antihash versus uniform Randomiser under RT-hash;
G = 1, N = 2..20, L = 6, D = 10.
from 2 to 20. For reference, the dashed line indicates a sta-
tion’s bandwidth share if G = 0. Due to poor predictibility
of the continuations fD−L, Antihash is less beneficial for
larger N, though even for N = 2 the regular stations are not
cut off. Taking a smaller D (discussed before), will make
fD−L even more unpredictable. Therefore Antihash is not
a serious threat to RT-hash.
6. Conclusion
A new RT-hash MAC protocol for wireless LANs has been
proposed to protect regular stations from stations using
greedy deferment selection strategies. Two such strategies,
Optimal Randomiser and Pseudoperiodic, were considered;
the former self-optimises the probability distribution of se-
lected deferments; the latter attempts to establish a token
passing-like scheme among greedy stations. RT-hash was
simulated in a full-hearability configuration and compared
with an earlier RT-1s protocol. Both protocols are compa-
rably resistant to Optimal Randomiser, but only RT-hash is
capable of counteracting Pseudoperiodic. A third strategy
called Antihash attempted to exploit a potential weakness
of RT-hash, but with minor success and only in a very
restricted scenario.
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